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REMOTE, ELITIST, 
OR NON-EXISTENT? 
THE EUROPEAN PUBLIC 
SPHERE IN THE DEBATES OF 
BRITISH POLITICAL ELITES
Abstract
This paper looks at how British political elites discuss the 
European public sphere and citizens’ participation within 
it. Drawing on 41 in-depth interviews with political elites 
– including politicians at national and European levels, jour-
nalists, political activists, and think-tank professionals – the 
paper explores interviewees’ understandings of the Europe-
an public sphere, and their perceptions about its vitality. Our 
research reveals a great deal of scepticism about the idea 
of a European public sphere, in part rooted in conventional 
British Euro-sceptic approaches, and in part fostered by a 
perception of the remoteness and democratic defi cit of the 
European Union.
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Introduction
The normative idea of the public sphere has been widely accepted as a concep-
tualisation of the ideal role citizens should play in contemporary politics. Though 
a contested concept, it remains central to any theorisation of citizens’ political par-
ticipation.1 Habermas (1974, 49) defi ned the public sphere as “a realm of our social 
life in which something approaching public opinion can be formed.” To scholars 
in communication and media studies “the term often connotes the realm of media, 
politics, and opinion processes in a more general, descriptive way” (Dahlgren 2001, 
35). Some suggest, however, that the idea of the public sphere has never been – 
and will never be – accomplished, and instead constitutes a useful ideal-type for 
conceiving the social spaces where public deliberation takes place, as well as the 
channels through which such deliberation reaches political representatives (e.g. 
Bennett  and Entman 2001). Although Habermas discussed the crucial role the media 
ought to play for a healthy public sphere to emerge (see, for example: Habermas 
1996, 373ﬀ .), this has remained a contentious subject in academic debates. Some 
scholars (e.g. Hartley 1992) argue that the media constitute the public sphere in 
and oﬀ  themselves, others believe that they could be more helpfully conceived 
of as a channel mediating between the public and political representatives (e.g. 
Baker 2007). To yet others, particular media genres (such as talk shows) constitute 
a mediated representation of the public sphere (e.g. Livingstone and Lunt 1994). 
A further layer of complexity is added to these debates in transnational contexts, 
as normative conceptions of citizenship, political participation and the media have 
generally assumed that democratic practices are only performed at a national level 
(Gripsrud and Moe 2010). However, this assumption needs to be rethought at a 
time when states make increasing concessions of sovereignty to supranational 
organisations, particularly since the democratic legitimacy and accountability of 
those organisations are fi ercely contested (Held and Koenig-Archibugi 2004).
This is especially the case for the European Union, as the ongoi ng process of 
European integration has always been accompanied by civic contestation and 
varying degrees of Euro-scepticism. While national ministers of member states 
(whose legitimacy is normally unquestioned) and democratically elected MEPs 
play the most prominent roles in EU politics, the politics of the Union have always 
been under suspicion for their (alleged) democratic defi cit. In a recent lecture, 
Habermas has argued that:
The European Union owes its existence to the eﬀ orts of political elites 
who could count on the passive consent of their more or less indiﬀ erent 
populations as long as the peoples could regard the Union as also being in 
their economic interests all things considered. The Union legitimized itself 
in the eyes of the citizens primarily through its outcomes and not so much 
from the fact that it fulfi lled the citizens’ political will. […] Thus, to the 
present day there remains a gulf at the European level between the citizens’ 
opinion- and will-formation, on the one hand, and the policies actually 
adopted to solve the pressing problems, on the other. This also explains why 
conceptions of the European Union and ideas of its future development 
have remained diﬀ use among the general population (Habermas 2013).
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More broadly, explanations of the democratic defi cit range from the absence 
of a demos, to the weakness of the EU parliament and the lack of real elections at 
the EU level.2 Scholars, politicians, and EU institutions themselves have become 
increasingly aware of the low levels of trust citizens show towards EU policies, as 
well as of the widespread political and institutional disengagement with the proj-
ect of European integration. This, of course, is all the more urgent in the context 
of the current fi nancial crisis and the challenges it poses to the common currency. 
Most observers assume that a stronger European identity and a vibrant 
European public sphere would be desirable to overcome such a democratic defi -
cit. In this sense, the application of the normative concept of the public sphere 
(Habermas 1992) to the European polity has been the most successful att empt at 
a conceptualisation of the relations between citizens, the media, and the political 
at the European level, and has been adopted by scholars (e.g. Kaitatz i-Whitlock 
2007), EU policy-makers (e.g. Wallström 2007), and EU institutions themselves (e.g. 
European Commission 2006). The idea of a European public sphere has been turned 
into the main driving force of EU communication policies in an att empt to remedy 
the remoteness of the EU (see, for example: European Commission 2001) which 
aﬀ ects the democratic legitimacy of the Union. However, these concerns have not 
crystallised into a more inclusive and participatory politics at the EU level. In the 
words of Gavin (2007, 153), the debate on the EU’s democratic defi cit “is idealized 
and abstracted and focuses more on procedures and structures than on processes.”
Probably as a consequence of the multiple EU-funded research projects on the 
topic (see Nieminen 2009 for a non-exhaustive list), there is already a signifi cant 
amount of literature analysing the existence, the constraints, and/or the conditions 
for a European public sphere. However, empirical research has often underplayed 
the deliberative aspect of the original Habermasian notion, equating the public 
sphere with what gets published or broadcast in (national) media.3 As Olivier 
Baisnée (2007, 500) suggested: “most research suﬀ ers from being far too media-
centric, tending to confl ate ‘the public sphere’ with ‘the media’: more specifi cally, 
national media – even more narrowly, the press.” While these equations tend to 
be rooted in complex operationalisations of the European public sphere4 and are 
often justifi ed on the basis of the media’s role in amplifying and condensing public 
debate (e.g. van de Steeg 2002), they stress the informative role of the media to the 
detriment of more participatory understandings. Consequently, they promote a 
limited view of citizens’ (potential) participation in European politics. 
Some scholars have brought the traditional debate on the European democratic 
defi cit a step further, raising concerns about who participates in EU-related political 
debates. Craig Calhoun (2004, n.p.), for example, characterised the (rather reduced 
and elitist) sectors that constitute the European public sphere (or its current em-
bryonic form):
First, there is the ‘oﬃ  cial’ Europe of the EU and the common aﬀ airs of 
its members ... It is a top-down aﬀ air in which Europe is represented to 
Europeans from Brussels ... Second, there is an elite discursive community 
that is much more active in public communication, is often multilingual 
(on the continent, at least), reads more and more internationally, and con-
sists largely of leaders in business and fi nance, parts of higher education, 
the media themselves, and to some extent government ... Third, there are 
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the widely ramifying networks of activists ... committ ed to many diﬀ erent 
causes from whole foods to human – and indeed animal – rights. Though 
most of these movements are global in their aims and to some extent their 
ultimate scope, Europe is overrepresented amongst their participants.
Other researchers, however, have questioned the “heavily normative liberal 
point of view” (Baisnée 2007, 500), suggesting that the European public sphere will 
only come into existence when all EU citizens participate in it. The elite domination 
of EU-related debates was also revealed by a content analysis of British newspa-
pers (Statham and Gray 2005), something which seemed signifi cant as “cleavages 
concerning Europe appear to cross-cut institutional actors and civil society actors 
and are not based on a cleavage between elites on one side, versus civil society 
actors on the other” (Statham and Gray 2005, 72), particularly in the British case.
Following debates on European citizenship and European identity (e.g. Bakke 
1995; Mayer and Palmowski 2004), other research (Grimm 1995; Schlesinger 1995; 
Schlesinger 1999; Kleinstüber 2001) has focused on concerns about the possibility 
of a common European public sphere without the existence of a common pub-
lic due to “the deep-rooted barriers of language, culture, ethnicity, nation, and 
state” (Schlesinger 1999, 271). This work has suggested that something akin to an 
“imagined community” (Anderson 1983) is required for a vibrant public sphere 
to emerge. Habermas (Habermas and Derrida 2003) himself, however, implied 
that a common language may not be essential when he cautiously suggested that 
the simultaneous demonstrations against the Iraq war held on 15 February 2003 
could well indicate the birth of a European public sphere. Grisprud (2007, 491), in 
turn, argued that transnational multilingual TV channels such as Eurosport and 
Euronews “have actually established in practice a common European public sphere, 
albeit multilingual and seriously limited in many ways” (emphasis in the original). 
However an empirical analysis of Euronews’ content questioned its performance as 
a platform furthering the democratisation of the EU and fostering citizens’ political 
participation (Garcia-Blanco and Cushion 2010). 
The EU has responded to concerns about the democratic defi cit and set up formal 
platforms for citizens’ participation in EU policy-making. Despite this, it is gener-
ally the case that citizens’ political participation and the European public sphere 
are mainly thought of in relation to the media. This implies an understanding of 
citizens’ political participation as the product of an informed and active citizenry. 
Indeed, an informed and active citizenry is widely seen as one of the most basic (and 
desirable) elements of a well-functioning democracy (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; 
Schudson 1999), insofar as public opinion mechanisms are central to the legitimacy 
of democratic governments (Sartori 1987). According to this understanding of the 
democratic process, representatives govern with the consent of public opinion, 
which is freely formed in exercises of public deliberation. 
The quality and meaningfulness of citizens’ political deliberation has also been 
subject to scholarly scrutiny. Research has highlighted concerns for the quality of cit-
izens’ political knowledge (see, for example: Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Curran 
et al. 2009). There is also a growing interest in the study of citizens’ informal political 
conversation (e.g. Eliasoph 1998; Walsh 2004; Mutz  2006; Jacobs et al. 2009), to the 
extent that Schudson (1997, 297) lamented the “veritable obsession” with political 
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conversation amongst scholars. There has been considerably less interest, however, 
in trying to understand how politicians are informed about the deliberations of the 
public sphere, and to what extent (if at all) the product of this deliberation impacts 
the decisions and the policies developed by political representatives. 
This paper, based on a series of interviews with British political actors, focuses 
on how MPs, MEPs, Welsh Assembly members, political activists, journalists, and 
individuals aﬃ  liated with NGOs and think tanks conceive of, and perceive the 
European public sphere. Following the approach of other scholars (Heikkilä and 
Kunelius 2006; Besley and Roberts 2010), we are interested in exploring British 
political actors’ understandings of the European public sphere and analysing the 
democratic implications of such understandings. These conceptions, we suggest, 
may contribute to constructing both the boundaries and opportunities for citizens’ 
political participation at the EU level. 
British Political Actors as a Case Study
Our study of prominent British political actors’ views on the European public 
sphere was mainly motivated by our interest in understanding how individuals 
aﬃ  liated with organisations which actually shape European politics – both at the 
institutional and at the non-institutional level – talk about public opinion and 
citizens’ views on policies. To investigate this, we carried out 41 semi-structured 
open-ended interviews. These interviews, which lasted between 40 and 90 minutes, 
included questions about the actors’ perceptions about the process of European 
integration, their understanding of the European polity, their views on the European 
public sphere, the role the media played in their understanding of the EU and the 
European public sphere, and also about the actions that their organisations and 
they, as individuals, undertook to follow citizens’ deliberations and opinions on EU 
policies. Most interviews were held face to face, although seven were carried out 
over the phone. All interviews took place between July 2008 and April 2009, and 
were transcribed and subsequently subjected to thematic coding (Boyatz is 1998).
We interviewed political representatives serving in the Welsh Assembly and 
the UK and European parliaments, on the basis of the belief of liberal democratic 
theory that elected representatives ought to be receptive to the deliberations of 
the public sphere, and should actively seek out knowledge about the concerns of 
the citizens they represent. We also interviewed individuals active in civil society 
organisations, on the understanding that they would aim to voice the opinions of 
diﬀ erent sectors of society. With the same purpose, and taking into account the 
growing lobbying power of think tanks in policy-making, we also interviewed 
individuals aﬃ  liated with think tanks related to EU politics. Finally, we carried 
out interviews with journalists covering EU politics, in an att empt to understand 
the extent to which they can act (or think they should act) as loudspeakers of the 
European public sphere, channelling citizens’ opinions and constituting a bridge 
between a European public sphere and the political actors which in principle 
should be aﬀ ected by it. Our interviewees thus represent a range of key elite actors 
in the public sphere, including government, civil society and media, who have an 
opportunity to infl uence public debate (e.g. McNair 2011).
Our selection of individual actors (see Table 1) was aimed at targeting the most 
prominent organisations participating in public debate related to the EU, as well 
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as at covering the widest possible range both in the right-left and Euro-sceptic-
pro-EU political spectrums. 
Table 1: Selected Organisations*
Political parties NGOs Think-tanks Print media
Labour (5) No Borders (5) Federal Trust (3) Daily Telegraph (1)
Conservative (5) Freedom Association (5) Centre for European Reform (2) The Guardian (1)
Plaid Cymru (5) Anti-Poverty Network (4) Bruges Group (4) Sunday Times (1)
*In brackets, the number of interviewees from each organisation
The diversity of the sample obviously had an impact upon the interview pro-
cess. The traditional diﬃ  culties researchers face when interviewing members of 
the political elite (see Lilleker 2003; Morris 2009) proved particularly relevant since 
the topic under discussion is such a divisive one in the British political context. 
Britain is conventionally seen as a strongly Euro-sceptic national culture (e.g. Gif-
ford 2008). Nonetheless, British elites tend to be essentially pragmatic regarding 
the Union, and support its policies if there are clear benefi ts for the UK. Debates 
about the nature of the model(s) of European polity or about EU policies have litt le 
place in British politics, as the debate is focused on the more fundamental ques-
tion of whether Britain should be part of the EU in the fi rst place. EU membership 
represents a major cleavage in British politics, revealing deep divisions amongst 
the public, political elites, and political leaders themselves (Budge et al. 2007, 166). 
These debates are often dominated by polarised positions advanced by political 
parties such as the UK Independence Party (a single-issue party advocating UK’s 
independence from the EU), think tanks such as the Bruges Group (another anti-EU 
single-issue organisation), and campaigns such as Bett er Oﬀ  Out (of the EU, obvi-
ously). In fact, the mere existence of high-profi le single-issue organisations (UKIP 
came out second in the 2009 European parliament election, obtaining more votes 
than the Labour Party itself, for example) is a clear sign of the anti-EU feeling that 
is so prominent in British public debate. 
The interviews often entailed dealing with professional interviewees who are 
well trained in tactics to avoid diﬃ  cult questions, get their message across (e.g. Ball 
1994; Batt eson and Ball 1995), and sugar-coat or exaggerate their claims (Berry 2002). 
Interviewing journalists presented its own unique challenges, as journalists have 
traditionally felt uneasy with academic explorations of their profession (Lewis 2009). 
Despite these methodological diﬃ  culties, our methodological approach enabled us 
to access discourses about citizens’ political participation in EU politics verbalised 
by political actors working in organisations related to the EU. If anything, we believe 
that our fi ndings probably magnify the eﬀ orts of our interviewees when it comes 
to keeping healthy ties with citizens and collectives in defi ning their organisation’s 
positions on specifi c EU policies.
British Political Actors and the European Public Sphere
Generally speaking, prominent British political organisations are hesitant to 
embrace the integration of the UK into a federal European polity. This is also the 
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case for the organisations we analysed. Even in the case of pro-EU individuals and 
organisations, the possibility of further European integration is frequently perceived 
as a potential att ack on British sovereignty, and as an opportunity for other countries 
to gain control over policies aﬀ ecting British citizens. The EU is often framed in 
public discourses as a remote, non-transparent, unaccountable Leviathan lacking 
the consent of the public that should legitimise institutions aspiring to be democrat-
ic. The media also play a part there: in addition to the anti-EU discourses voiced by 
the outlets owned by Rupert Murdoch (Jones et al. 2006), the Mail and the Telegraph 
also largely advance anti-EU positions. The main media outlets usually taking a 
pro-EU position are The Independent, The Guardian, and The Economist.
The British debate on the European Union has been shaped by the importance of 
concerns about the “technocracy” of the Union (Featherstone 1994). Issues around 
the loss of national sovereignty have been far more salient in Britain than in other 
large EU nations such as Germany and France. As the anti-European tabloid The 
Sun warned its readers, “Britain is drifting ever closer towards being swallowed 
up by a European superstate” meaning the “end of our nation” (cited in Walters 
and Haahr 2005, 86). This refl ects a widespread discourse which largely constructs 
the EU as Britain’s other, “coding it as a regime of bureaucratic domination and 
anti-citizenship” (Walters and Haahr 2005, 86).
The prominence of such claims was made evident as most of our interviewees 
conveyed discourses on the perceived “democratic defi cit” and the “EU superstate.” 
Even the most pro-European actors found grounds for concern, refl ecting the gen-
erally Euro-sceptic nature of British political discourse. Probably as a consequence 
of the British questioning of the EU, the debate about the desirability of fostering, 
enabling or contributing to a European public sphere is not on the agenda of pub-
lic debate in the UK. The organisations we studied, therefore, do not have oﬃ  cial 
opinions on that particular question, although their members take particular views 
when asked about the European public sphere. 
The idea of the democratic defi cit was at the root of the most prevalent con-
ceptions of the European public sphere. According to these understandings, the 
European public sphere could be conceived either as an elitist space where EU 
politicians meet, or as a discursive construct excluding rank and fi le citizens from 
political deliberation at the EU level. Some examples, from diﬀ erent sides of the 
political spectrum and the pro-EU / anti-EU divide:
There’s certainly an elite in Brussels who seem to be operating almost in a sphere that 
most of us cannot penetrate, and they are disconnected from the main populaces of all 
countries, and not just this one (The Freedom Association, Interviewee 2).
There is a Brussels bubble, and one of the dangers within the European project is that 
opinions within the Brussels bubble are becoming so distant from the views of ordinary 
people (The Freedom Association, Interviewee 5).
It [the European public sphere] exists … I think it excludes most people (Plaid Cymru, 
Interviewee 2).
The EU seems to be something for some leaders meeting in Brussels, and deciding a cou-
ple of things without consulting (Anti-Poverty Network, Interviewee 1).
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The apparently institutionalised idea of the “Brussels bubble” is at the root of 
the doubts that most of our interviewees showed towards EU institutions. A clear 
majority of our interviewees blamed EU institutions for the lack of a European 
public sphere or, alternatively, for the elitism of the European public sphere. In 
principle, such a sphere should be independent from all political power and emerg-
ing from civil society itself, as a social space where citizens could meet to discuss 
matt ers of public interest and regulate the authority of political institutions and of 
those exercising political power. Clearly, such a vision is at odds with interviewees’ 
experiences on the ground.
Considering the prominence of discourses around the “democratic defi cit,” the 
“EU technocracy” and the “lack of accountability” in British Euro-sceptic discourses, 
it could be assumed that any att empt at widening citizens’ political participation 
in the EU polity would be welcomed. However, this was not always the case. For 
example, some interviewees from Euro-sceptic organisations like the Freedom 
Association and the Bruges Group argued that the emergence of a European 
public sphere should be actively resisted, so that a European polity would never 
be eﬀ ectively constituted: “I’d say [there is] no [European public sphere], and any 
eﬀ orts to create one should be discouraged ... Don’t try to create an alternative set 
of European identity with its EU fl ag, its EU anthem when people don’t particularly 
want it” (The Freedom Association, Interviewee 1)
A prominent Bruges Group member, in turn, suggested that the idea of widening 
the scope of political participation at the EU level clashed with what they saw as 
the very founding principle of the EU:
People talk about the EU having a democratic defi cit, but that’s the whole point of the EU. 
It is to stop ordinary people making their decisions through a democratic system and to 
make things happen by a more or less self-appointed apparently enlightened elite. That’s 
the whole point. Decisions are taken behind closed doors, not through the democratic 
system … No, the EU can’t be democratised that way, because the only point of the EU is 
to be anti-democratic. You don’t establish an anti-democratic organisation and then make 
it democratic (Bruges Group, Interviewee 1).
This analysis, though coming from a very diﬀ erent political vantage point, is 
similar to the position of Habermas (2013) discussed above; refl ecting a critique of 
the democratic defi cit in EU politics as rooted in the founding institutional logic. 
Other interviewees blamed poor media coverage of EU issues as responsible for 
citizens’ lack of engagement with EU politics: “I think one major problem is the 
media. In Britain it has increased our antipathy towards anything European and I 
think that translates in terms of the way people feel about other European people” 
(Plaid Cymru, Interviewee 3).
The political elitism of the EU was not always seen as a problematic att ribute. In 
fact, some pro-EU Conservative interviewees promoted a more formal understand-
ing of the public sphere as the business of politicians, rather than of citizens. This 
conception could well be a transposition of widespread interpretations of the British 
unwritt en constitution, assigning “deliberation to the politicians, rather than to the 
public” (Conover et al. 2002, 25). These conceptions either equated the European 
public sphere with the EU Council of Ministers (Conservative Party, Interviewee 
1), or held that a European public sphere consisting of EU representatives indeed 
existed but was unsuccessful due to insuﬃ  cient resources: 
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I think that we are very well served here by the EU representatives, but I think they are 
under-resourced. It is diﬃ  cult for them really because the more they do the bett er it will 
be to understand what the European Union does … It should be organised with bett er 
resources and trained oﬃ  cials. The reason is that all communication should be able to 
remove misguided prejudice … I think that it’s a question of fi nance for the EU represen-
tatives so as to be able [to] have a benefi cial infl uence and correct some of the scare stories 
in the media and understand that the whole EU is about people and advancement, not 
about regulation (Conservative Party, Interviewee 5).
Two concerns arise from such understandings of the public sphere. The fi rst has 
to do with the function of the public sphere itself. Placed at the core of institutional 
politics, the public sphere loses its civic, deliberative nature, as well as its purpose 
of monitoring political institutions and discussing matt ers of public interest. This 
understanding of the European public sphere hijacks its normative duty of hold-
ing politicians and political institutions to account on the basis of public opinion, 
assimilating the public sphere with the basic institutional checks-and-balances 
system operating in European politics. “The second reason for concern is the idea 
of “communicating the EU bett er,” which could be viewed as a veiled justifi cation 
for institutional PR and spin, legitimising a stream of information fl owing from 
political actors to the citizenry so that citizens can just express support or consent, 
rather than fostering substantial deliberation and participation. Such an under-
standing suggests that the citizenry should be governed from the top down, rather 
than taking the role of a political community whose voice(s) political actors should 
aim at articulating and representing. 
Other Voices, Other Platforms
The British political actors we interviewed believe that the main barriers to a 
European public sphere are the lack of pan-European media and the linguistic 
diversity of the EU. Thus, some anti-EU interviewees think that the lack of a lin-
gua franca renders the European public sphere an impossible achievement. As 
one interviewee stated: “No, there’s not [any hope for a European public sphere 
to emerge] because not everybody speaks English or German or French” (Bruges 
Group, Interviewee 2). However, those who are more optimistic about the process 
of European integration believe that this could be solved by improving the linguistic 
abilities of the population. While it is obvious that improved language skills may 
facilitate cultural exchange and political deliberation amongst citizens belonging 
to diﬀ erent linguistic communities, a social space for discussing matt ers of public 
interest does not necessarily emerge as soon as there is a common language. A 
vibrant public sphere requires social practices enabling deliberation, channels of 
communication establishing common grounds for debate, and links between dif-
ferent social groups and political representatives and institutions (for a discussion, 
see Eliasoph 1998, 10ﬀ .). 
In this sense, some interviewees saw the lack of pan-European media as a fun-
damental constraint for the full development of a European public sphere:
We don’t have a single European newspaper, one newspaper that every European can 
read, no TV channel which is common for Europe. You cannot create a state called Europe 
because there is no demos … If someone is trying to construct a united Europe there 
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should at least be a European News service informing all Europeans about the things 
happening in Europe. (Conservative Party, Interviewee 3).
Interviewees advancing such positions suggested that the growth and multi-
plication of pan-European media could contribute to the birth of the public sphere 
at the EU level. 
The interviewees’ focus on institutions highlights the conceptual need to link 
the European public sphere with tangible, real world counterparts. There were, 
however, alternative conceptions of the European public sphere, incorporating 
widespread utopian understandings of the internet as an empowering and eman-
cipatory tool (see Livingstone 2005): 
I think that there are lots of possibilities: the internet, blogs. I don’t think this is the kind of 
top-down kind of thing (The Daily Telegraph, Interviewee 1)
The new technologies that are being developed so that people could communicate online 
have helped the communication space signifi cantly … I think there should be more oppor-
tunities but I can’t guess how it should be organised (Labour Party, Interviewee 1).
In any case, and despite the diﬃ  culties in imagining how the European public 
sphere should be organised, interviewees from almost all organisations believed 
in the desirability of a more participatory politics at the EU level:
It would be a fantastic thing to happen, to have that common area of debate … Absolutely. 
I don’t know how it should be organised, but I’m all for it (No Borders, Interviewee 2) 
I think that it would be good to have something in place so that EU citizens could discuss 
the EU and the future of the EU in their own ... So I think there is a need for something 
separate that will help to facilitate those discussions (Conservative Party, Interviewee 2).
Regardless of widespread reservations about the practice of the European 
public sphere, then, the normative ideal of citizens’ active participation in public 
deliberation is a signifi cant thread in discourses of actors across the political spec-
trum. The presence of such discourses signals the fact that weariness about the 
possibility of a European public sphere among UK actors is based on culturally 
and geographically specifi c experiences and debates, rather than on an underlying 
mistrust of mechanisms of the public sphere itself.
Conclusion
Our paper has suggested that despite the scholarly resonance of the idea of 
the European public sphere, political actors are largely sceptical about its actual 
existence. Across the political spectrum, our interviewees shared key views about 
systemic problems in the project of creating a European public sphere. They cited 
the isolation of EU political elites (the so-called “Brussels bubble”) and EU political 
institutions; the short-sightedness of national news media, and the lack of pan-Eu-
ropean perspectives in the news; or the absence of virtual or physical platforms/
spaces where citizens can gather to deliberate were often mentioned as potential 
explanations for the lack of a more deliberative politics at the EU level.
As a consequence of these perceived systemic problems, most of our inter-
viewees argued that the European public sphere either does not exist, or that it is 
an elite space which only includes policy-making actors and/or other privileged 
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groups or individuals, and has litt le relevance to the lives of ordinary British and 
European citizens. The lack of an authentic, bott om-up European public sphere 
was sometimes presented as a matt er-of-fact reality, while some interviewees saw 
it as a problematic indicator of the democratic defi cit of the EU. 
Unlike the journalists interviewed by Heikkilä and Kunelius (2006), the British 
political actors and journalists we interviewed perceived the idea of the European 
public sphere as intangible and abstract: nobody really knows what it should look 
like or how to participate in it. Even politicians were at a loss as to where and how 
to look for a hypothetical European public sphere, and would probably not know 
how to recognise it if they came across it. The 41 interviewees referred to the Eu-
ropean public sphere in the third person, as if they did not belong to, relate to, or 
were aﬀ ected by it. This view is perhaps accentuated by the generalised perception 
of remoteness of the EU centres of political decision-making.
Overall, then, in the British context the notion of the European public sphere 
as a viable space for citizen participation remains problematic, rather than taken 
for granted as an empirical reality and/or normative ideal. As such, this concept, 
which has such currency within academic debates, appears to have limited relevance 
to the experience and discourses of the actors associated with it. The widespread 
scepticism about the existence of a European public sphere coincides with a broad-
er concern about the lack of opportunities for meaningful citizen participation in 
European politics, even among those very actors who are supposed to enable such 
participation. It resonates with broader Euro-sceptic discourses circulating in British 
society, and highlights the persistent dominance of the national. Nonetheless, our 
paper also demonstrates that the idea of the European public sphere does have a 
conceptual use for our interviewees: It provided them with a forceful vocabulary 
for articulating the limitations of a utopian ideal which exists in forceful tension 
with their actual experience of political life. 
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Notes:
1. Feminist, communitarian, and radical democratic theorists have been amongst the main 
contributors to the debate about the concept of the public sphere (for a good discussion, see 
Thompson 1995, 69-75; or Calhoun 1992). Even Habermas (1992) joined the debate himself. 
While feminists have called for a more gender-inclusive public sphere (see, for example: Fraser 
1992), radical democrats reject the concept, as it necessarily seeks political consensus (“For a 
radical and plural democracy, the belief that a fi nal resolution of confl icts is eventually possible, 
even if envisaged as an asymptotic approach to the regulative ideal of a free and unconstrained 
communication, as in Habermas, far from providing the necessary horizon of the democratic 
project, is something that puts it at risk” Mouff e 1993, 8). Taylor’s (1995) communitarian approach 
addresses the essentialism of the idea of a single public sphere, suggesting that there is a 
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multiplicity of public spheres within Western societies. These public spheres, nested within 
bigger ones, often confl ict with each other. This position challenges both the unity of the public 
sphere (as there can be more than one public sphere), its scope (as nested public spheres can be 
thematically focused), and its boundaries (as nested public spheres do not need to conform to the 
boundaries of the nation state – in fact, they can even be transnational). A similar approach can be 
found in the critical work of Gitlin (1998).
2. Weiler et al. (1995) gathered diff erent arguments supporting the idea of a democratic defi cit 
in the EU that were commonly found in the media, in academic works, or heard from citizens, 
politicians, and practitioners. A more recent academic discussion on the democratic defi cit of the 
EU can be found in Follesdal and Hix (2006).
3. Most of these studies deal with EU key events – such as elections to the European parliament 
(Kevin 2001; de Vreese et al. 2006), the introduction of the Euro (de Vreese et al. 2001), or heads of 
government summits (Semetko and Valkenburg 2000). Research on day-to-day European politics 
is more scarce, consisting basically of Norris’ (2000) secondary analysis of Euromedia data, and the 
results of a content analysis of TV news from fi ve European countries mixing routine days with 
peak EU events (Peter and de Vreese 2004; Peter et al. 2003).
4. According to van de Steeg (2002), the European public sphere emerges when the same topics 
are simultaneously discussed in the national media of diff erent European countries with a similar 
frame of relevance (van de Steeg 2002). A number of empirically-based works followed this 
perspective, analysing the media coverage of EU enlargement (van de Steeg 2002) and the Haider 
debate (van de Steeg et al. 2003; van de Steeg 2006). Trenz (2004), in turn, analysed national 
media coverage on European issues (mostly related to EU institutions), and concluded that the 
concomitance of topics and the similar frame national papers use when dealing with EU issues 
could be “suffi  cient proof for proclaiming the existence of a European public sphere” (Trenz 2004, 
313).
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